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Abstract
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there remains a number of protracted conflicts, 
within and between the successor states, concerning irredentist entities. This article examines four 
cases of such de facto states, the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-
Karabakh and Transnistria. After reviewing the genesis and geopolitical significance of these 
conflicts, the article focuses on the role of the European Union in conflict resolution. We argue 
that the EU plays a marginal role in all the protracted conflicts. Based on an analysis of its recent 
policies, we claim that the Union will maintain a low profile in the foreseeable future.
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1. Introduction
Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, some of its successor states are still 
riddled by conflicts with secessionist entities 
that erupted in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Due to their seemingly dormant state and the 
failure of the parties to achieve a final settlement, 
these conflicts have been referred to as “frozen 
conflicts” or “unresolved conflicts”. In this article, 
the term “protracted conflict” will be used, which 
emphasizes the evolving nature of the conflicts.1 
Four of the conflicts under analysis have resulted 
in the creation of de facto states, namely the self-
proclaimed Abkhazian Republic, the Republic 
of South Ossetia, the Pridnestrovian Moldavian 
Republic (usually referred to as “Transnistria”) and 
the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. De facto states 
are political entities that enjoy sovereignty over a 
territory and a population but are not recognized by 
any or the vast majority of other states.2 Of the four 
de facto states under analysis, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia have obtained very limited international 
recognition.3 The key international financial and 
military supporters of Transnistria and Nagorno-
Karabakh, Russia and Armenia respectively, have 
not recognized the self-proclaimed status of either 
of the entities.
The four conflicts in question differ from one 
another in terms of scope, history and international 
actors involved. However, they share several 
essential features, including a protracted conflict 
between the secessionist entity and the parent 
state, the de facto state‘s economic and military 
dependence on a patron state and the gradual 
consolidation of semi-independent state structures 
1 The term was adopted also by the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe, which has a “Special Representative for 
Protracted Conflicts” to represent the organization at the Geneva 
talks on the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts.
2 D. Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Unresolved 
Conflicts and De facto States (Washington: United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 2004), p. 16.
3 Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru have recognized 
both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As of 31 May 2011, 
Abkhazia was recognized also by Vanuatu – see http://www.
governmentofvanuatu.gov.vu/index.php?option=com_content
&view=article&id=95:vanuatus-recognition-to-the-republic-of-
abkhazia&catid =1:latest-news&Itemid=65 (accessed on 17 July 
2011).
during the last two decades.4 Russia acts as patron 
state for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which were 
both breakaway provinces of Georgia, as well as 
for Transnistria, which was part of Moldova when 
the latter gained its independence from the USSR. 
Armenia is the patron state of Nagorno-Karabakh 
and is officially still at war with Azerbaijan, 
the breakaway province‘s parent state. Given 
Armenia‘s military and economic dependence on 
Russia, it is sensible to argue that the Kremlin has 
at least some influence on the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict as well.5
Since Russia is a key player in all four conflicts, 
its policies and role will be a subject of analysis in 
this article. However, in order to understand the 
specificities of each conflict, the analysis will first 
draw on the most recent literature to outline the 
current state of the four conflicts and the role of 
international conflict resolution efforts. In this 
context, particular attention will be devoted to the 
European Union‘s (EU) contribution to conflict 
resolution until now. Brussels has an interest in 
the resolution of the four conflicts under analysis, 
as they destabilize areas that are strategic for 
the EU’s energy security and for the stability of 
its neighbourhood. The EU has attempted to 
become more involved and claim a role in the 
resolution of these conflicts, particularly through 
the appointment of Special Representatives and 
the deployment of civilian missions in and around 
the separatist entities. Furthermore, Brussels 
concluded Action Plans with partner states within 
the framework of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP), which inter alia stipulate priorities 
for both sides to address the conflicts. 
However, so far, EU policies on the ground 
have kept a low profile and focused mostly on 
4 M. Kapitonenko, ‘Resolving post-Soviet “frozen conflicts”: is 
regional integration helpful?’, Caucasian Review of International 
Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2009), p. 37. The term “parent state” refers 
to the state to which the secessionist entities belong according to 
international law; the “patron state” is the international actor that 
supports the secessionist entity and its consolidation as a de facto 
state.
5 Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, 
a military alliance under heavy Russian influence. Furthermore, 
Russia is by far the main international investor in Armenia, as well 
as Yerevan’s main creditor; see H. Khachatrian ‘Foreign Investment 
in Armenia: influence of the crisis and other peculiarities’, Caucasus 
Analytical Digest, No. 28 (June 2011), p. 18.
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the monitoring of borders and local economic 
rehabilitation. The analysis will show that this 
approach has not been successful, as Brussels has 
not been able to increase its role and implement 
its ambitious conflict resolution agenda in the 
region. This is also due to the EU’s lack of 
leverage in the conflicts and the reluctance of 
some member states, such as Germany, Italy, 
France, Spain, Greece and Cyprus6, to challenge 
Russia’s dominant position. The EU is currently 
excluded from negotiations on the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict and has no influence on internal 
developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Transnistria constitutes a partial exception, as 
this is the only conflict where the EU has some 
noteworthy leverage on both the parent state and 
the secessionist entity. However, also in this case 
Brussels has achieved only very modest results. 
This article will argue that, in spite of its declared 
ambitions, the EU cannot make a significant 
contribution to the conflict resolution process due 
to its lack of internal coherence, political will and 
economic and military leverage. As a result of 
these deficiencies, it is highly unlikely that the EU 
will step up its efforts and play a more prominent 
role in any of these conflicts in the short and 
medium term.
6 Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu have called these member states 
Russia’s “strategic partners” (Germany, France, Italy and Spain) 
and “Trojan horses” (Greece and Cyprus) in the European Union, 
due to their tight economic and diplomatic relations with Russia; 
see M. Leonard and N. Popescu, A power audit of EU-Russia 
relations. European Council on Foreign Relations (November 
2007), pp. 27-36.
2. Protracted conflicts and de facto 
states in the post-Soviet space
2.1 Geopolitical context and Russia’s role
The four conflicts under analysis take place in 
areas that are of considerable strategic importance 
for both Russia and the European Union. The 
conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-
Karabakh constitute the main determinant of 
instability in the South Caucasus (see Figure 1), 
a region that the European Union has identified 
as a key transit corridor in its plans for the 
diversification of energy supplies.7 For Russia, the 
South Caucasus is strategically significant both 
as an area within the post-Soviet space, which 
the Kremlin considers a top priority of its foreign 
policy, and as a territory bordering with its own 
troublesome North Caucasian republics, which 
have recently witnessed secessionist wars, the 
spread of Islamic terrorism and a deep economic 
and structural crisis.8
The National Security Strategy of the Russian 
Federation to 2020 states that “The main threats 
to the border-related interests and security of the 
Russian Federation are the presence and possible 
escalation of armed conflicts near its state borders 
[…]” and emphasizes the risks related to the 
spillover of illegal activities such as terrorism 
and arms and drug trafficking from the conflict 
areas to Russia’s bordering regions.9 However, 
the Kremlin has applied a different rationale to 
the Transnistrian conflict, where it supports a 
separatist government that earns considerable 
revenues from illegal activities such as those 
listed in the National Security Strategy. Due to 
7 ‘Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond - A Blueprint 
for an integrated European energy network’, Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions (17 November 2010), pp. 10-11.
8 In this regard, see the National Security Strategy of the Russian 
Federation to 2020, available (in Russian) at http://www.
scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html (accessed on 18 July 2011); S. 
Dimitrakopoulou and A. Liaropoulos, ‘Russia’s National Security 
Strategy to 2020: a great power in the making?’, Caucasian 
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2010) and M. de 
Haas and H. Schroeder, ‘Russian National Security Strategy’, 
Russian Analytical Digest, No. 62 (June 2009).
9 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020, 
paragraph 41.
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the proliferation of such activities, Transnistria 
constitutes a security challenge for the European 
Union, as the latter’s eastern borders are a mere 
150 kilometers away from the secessionist 
province. For Russia, the relative distance of 
its borders mitigates the security risks posed 
by criminal activities in Transnistria. Most 
importantly, these risks are offset by the strategic 
advantages of having a friendly government in 
the secessionist entity that practically thwarts any 
Moldovan ambition to join NATO or the European 
Union.10
Following NATO’s and the EU’s eastern 
enlargement in the years 1999-2004, the protracted 
conflicts in the post-Soviet space have become 
one of the instruments in the Kremlin’s toolkit to 
prevent any further eastward expansion of both 
organizations close to Russia’s borders. Neither 
the EU nor NATO would accept a new member 
state that lacks full control over its territory, is 
involved in internal conflicts with breakaway 
regions and has Russian troops on its soil. Thus, 
10 A. Akçakoca, T. Vanhauwaert, R. Whitman and S. Wolff, ‘After 
Georgia: conflict resolution in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood’, 
EPC Issue Paper, No. 58 (April 2009), p. 11.
the conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
are one of the main factors preventing Georgia 
from undertaking the desired path of NATO 
membership. Moldova and Azerbaijan have not 
manifested an interest in joining the Atlantic 
alliance until now; if they decided to do so, the 
conflicts over Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh 
would most likely be an insurmountable obstacle 
in the path to accession.11
The Georgian-Russian war of August 
2008 provides the best example of the wider 
geopolitical significance of the protracted conflicts 
in the post-Soviet space. The “de-freezing” and 
rapid escalation of the conflicts in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia was mainly the consequence of 
US-Russian disputes in the international arena 
and the direct and indirect intervention of foreign 
powers in the conflicts. Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence in February 2008 and its recognition 
by the United States and its allies, in violation of 
international law, angered Russia and provided 
11 For a more detailed overview of the strategic relevance of 
the protracted conflicts, see also U. Halbach, ‘Ungelöste 
Regionalkonflikte im Südkaukasus’, SWP Studie (March 2010), 
pp. 8-11.
Figure 1: Geostrategic situation and the conflicts in the Caucasus region. 
http://mondediplo.com/maps/georgiawar
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secessionist entities with a pretext to revive 
their demands for international recognition.12 
Furthermore, Washington’s strong backing of 
the Saakashvili government in Georgia, which 
rapidly increased military spending and took an 
aggressive stance towards Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, emboldened Tbilisi to seek a solution of 
the secessionist conflicts by military means.13
Following the August 2008 war, the United 
States have kept a low profile in their policies 
towards the four secessionist conflicts and 
attempted to obtain Russia’s cooperation on 
issues to which they attach a higher priority, most 
notably Iran’s nuclear programme and the war in 
Afghanistan. Conversely, Russia has maintained 
its strategic position and even stepped up its 
military and economic presence in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. Following the crisis, the Kremlin 
also undertook some mediation efforts in the 
context of the Transnistrian and the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflicts, but failed to achieve any 
significant breakthroughs. 
The analysis will now turn to the history and 
specificities of each protracted conflict. The 
Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts will be 
analyzed independently from each other, as their 
history and international mediation attempts until 
2008 differ for the most part. 
2.2 Abkhazia
Abkhazia is a strip of land covering approximately 
8,700 square kilometres (Figure 1), which 
amounts to 12% of the area that became part of 
12 H. Krueger, ‘Implications of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
for international law’, in Caucasus Review of International 
Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2009), pp. 121-142; B. Harzl, ‘Conflicting 
perceptions: Russia, the West and Kosovo’, Review of Central and 
East European Law 33 (2008), pp. 491-518; M. Siddi, ‘Abkhazia, 
Kosovo and the right to external self-determination of peoples’, 
Central Asia and the Caucasus, Issue 12, No. 1 (2011), pp. 62-70; 
M. Mammadov, ‘”Traditional gap” in the ICJ’s advisory opinion 
on Kosovo’, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 4, 
No. 4 (2010), pp. 313-324.
13 US policies are analyzed in S. Blank, ‘What Comes After the 
Russo-Georgian War? What’s at Stake in the CIS’, American 
Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 30, No. 6 (November 2008), 
pp. 379-391; J. Nichol, ‘Georgia and NATO enlargement. 
Issues and implications’, CRS Report for Congress (7 March 
2008); F. Ismailzade, ‘US policy towards the South Caucasus: 
how to move forward’, Caucasus Analytical Digest, No. 13 
(February 2010), pp. 5-8.
Georgia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Abkhazia‘s territory is delimited by the main ridge 
of the Greater Caucasus in the north-east and the 
Black Sea coast in the south-west. According 
to the Abkhaz census of 2003, approximately 
216,000 people inhabited the region, including 
94,500 Abkhazians (44.2%), 45,000 Armenians 
(21.0%), 44,000 Georgians (20.6%), 23,500 
Russians (10.9%) and some smaller Ukrainian, 
Greek and Estonian minorities.14 These statistics 
do not include the 200,000 Georgians who were 
expelled from the region during the 1992-1993 
war and have not returned to their homes.15 The 
number of Georgians living in Abkhazia today is 
most likely even smaller than the one stated in the 
2003 census, due to the expulsions that took place 
after the August 2008 conflict.
The history of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict 
dates back from the early twentieth century. The 
first military clashes between the ethnic groups 
took place during the revolutionary period and 
the civil war, when the Abkhazians sided with 
the Bolsheviks and the Georgians with the 
Mensheviks. In 1922, Abkhazia joined the Soviet 
Union as an independent Union Republic (the 
Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic). However, in 
1931 Stalin demoted the status of Abkhazia to that 
of Autonomous Socialist Federal Republic within 
the Georgian Republic and intensified the policy 
of “Georgianisation” of the province.16 In the 
post-Stalinist era, tensions between Abkhazians 
and Georgians persisted, as the former felt 
discriminated by Abkhazia‘s administrative 
14 2003 Census of the Republic of Abkhazia, http://www.ethno-
kavkaz.narod.ru/rnabkhazia.html (accessed on 18 July 2011).
15 In 1989, the total population of Abkhazia was of 525.061, 
of which 45.7% (239,872) were ethnic Georgians. However, 
Abkhazians had become a minority in their own land as a 
result of their forced expulsion during the tsarist empire and 
the resettlement of ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia during the 
Stalinist period. In 1886, Abkhazians made up around 85% of the 
population, Georgians only 6%; D. Müller, ‘Demography’, in G. 
Hewitt (ed.), The Abkhazians (Richmond, 1999), pp. 235-237; 
НАСЕЛЕНИЕ АБХАЗИИ (Population of Abkhazia), available at 
http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/rnabkhazia.html (accessed on 
18 July 2011).
16 S. Lakoba, ‘History: 1917-1989’, in G. Hewitt (ed.), The 
Abkhazians (Richmond, 1999), pp. 89-94; Report of the 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict 
in Georgia, Vol. II, p. 67; R. G. Suny, The making of the Georgian 
nation (Bloomington, 1994), p. 215.
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inclusion in Georgia and the latter complained 
about their underrepresentation in the political 
structures of the autonomous republic.17 
When the Soviet Union collapsed, Georgia 
declared its independence, but it soon fell in a 
civil war involving rival Georgian factions and 
South Ossetians. In August 1992, Georgian forces 
invaded Abkhazia and started a civil war that 
lasted more than a year, causing large material 
destruction and thousands of casualties. The 
conflict was ended by Russia‘s intervention and 
mediation. Georgia had to sign the Agreement on 
a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, concluded 
on 14 May 1994 in Moscow under the mediation 
of Russia and the United Nations (UN), and accept 
the deployment of 3,000 Russian peacekeepers 
under the mandate of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). The CIS mission was 
to operate under the supervision of a UN mission, 
the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia 
(UNOMIG). The subsequent negotiations for a 
resolution of the conflict produced no significant 
results.18
Mikhail Saakashvili‘s rise to power in Georgia 
and his policies aimed at recovering sovereignty 
over the country‘s breakaway provinces led to 
another escalation of the crisis in the summer 
of 2008.19 In the attempt to thwart Georgia‘s 
application for NATO membership, Russia 
increased its support to the breakaway provinces 
and intervened militarily on their side when 
Tbilisi launched a military operation against South 
Ossetia in August 2008. The war ended with the 
defeat of Georgian military forces and both sides‘ 
acceptance of a Six-Point Ceasefire Agreement 
mediated by French President Nicolas Sarkozy.20 
17 C. Zürcher, The Post-Soviet Wars (New York, 2007), pp. 120-121.
18 A. Petersen, ‘The 1992-93 Georgia-Abkhazia war: a forgotten 
conflict’, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 
4 (2008), pp. 195-197; Security Council Document S/1994/583. 
Annex I: Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces Agreement 
(Moscow, 14 May 1994); Report of the Independent International 
Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Vol. II, pp. 80-89.
19 For a discussion of Georgian moves in the upper Kodori valley in 
2006 and the outbreak of hostilities in August 2008, see Report 
of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Conflict in Georgia, Vol. II, pp. 89-90 and 209-210.
20 The Six Point Ceasefire Agreement is available in Report of the 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict 
in Georgia, Vol. III, p. 587.
On 26 August 2008, Russia recognized the 
independence of both Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. During the following months, the 
Kremlin increased its military presence in both 
regions and made considerable investments in the 
economies of both secessionist entities. Following 
the termination of UNOMIG and of the mission 
of the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE) in Georgia, which were both 
determined by a Russian veto on their extension 
in 2009, there is no other significant international 
presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The 
European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia 
(EUMM), established in October 2008 by the EU 
Council, has been denied access to the Abkhaz 
and South Ossetian side of the border and operates 
exclusively on undisputed Georgian territory, even 
though its mandate includes monitoring within 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.21
2.3 South Ossetia
South Ossetia covers an area of approximately 
3,900 square kilometers, most of which are 
mountainous territory (Figure 1). Most of its 
estimated 55,000 inhabitants live in the southern 
part of the region, close to the administrative 
border with Georgia proper. According to the last 
Soviet census, Ossetians constituted around 66% 
of the population, followed by Georgians (29%), 
Russians (2%), and other smaller ethnic groups. 
Contrary to Abkhazia, the ethnic balance in the 
region has remained fairly stable over the last 
century.22 
Although also the first clashes between South 
Ossetians and Georgians date back from the civil 
war period (1918-1920), relations between the 
two ethnic groups were relatively good throughout 
the Soviet era.23 The situation deteriorated quickly 
at the time of the Soviet Union‘s collapse. The 
Georgian nationalist government led by Zviad 
21 Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on 
the Conflict in Georgia, Vol. II, pp. 89-91 and 211-219, Vol. III, 
pp. 587-594. 
22 НАСЕЛЕНИЕ ЮЖНОЙ ОСЕТИИ (Population of South 
Ossetia), available at http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/r 
nsossetia.html (accessed on 19 July 2011).
23 Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on 
the Conflict in Georgia, Vol. II, p. 4.
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Gamsakhurdia attempted to bring the region 
under tight Georgian control. South Ossetia had 
enjoyed the status of Autonomous Oblast within 
the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic under the 
Soviet Union and, perceiving the threat of losing 
any form of autonomy, it proclaimed its full 
sovereignty within the Soviet Union in September 
1990. The clash with Tbilisi led to a military 
escalation that resulted in a destructive war lasting 
from January 1991 until June 1992. In the summer 
of 1992 the Georgians accepted a Russian-
brokered ceasefire and an agreement establishing 
a security corridor along the administrative border 
between South Ossetia and Georgia proper, a Joint 
Control Commission (with representatives from 
Georgia, Russia, North Ossetia and South Ossetia) 
and a Joint Peacekeeping Force of Russian, 
Georgians and Ossetian soldiers. Furthermore, 
the OSCE dispatched a mission to monitor the 
peacekeeping operation.24 
The re-escalation of the conflict in South 
Ossetia took place at the same time as the Abkhaz 
conflict. Georgian attempts to re-establish control 
over the region revived tensions starting in the 
summer of 2004. On 7 August 2008, the Georgian 
army shelled the city of Tskhinvali, killing more 
than a hundred civilians, ten Russian peacekeepers 
and wounding many others, and launched a major 
military operation against South Ossetia. This 
provoked Russia‘s military intervention, which 
repelled the Georgian attack and expelled Tbilisi‘s 
troops from the entire region. In the process, 
around 20,000 Georgian civilians were also 
expelled from South Ossetia.25 The subsequent 
phases of the conflict, including the achievement 
of a ceasefire and Russia‘s recognition of the 
separatist entity‘s independence, coincide 
with the events described above with regard to 
Abkhazia. For both Georgian separatist republics 
24 Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Conflict in Georgia, Vol. II, pp. 89-91 and 211-219, Vol. II, pp. 92-
100; Halbach, ‘Ungelöste Regionalkonflikte’, pp. 12-15; P. Baev, C. 
Zürcher and J. Koehler, ‘Civil Wars in the Caucasus’ in Paul Collier 
& Nicholas Sambanis (eds.), Understanding Civil War: Evidence and 
Analysis (Washington, 2005), pp. 267-275; Akçakoca, Vanhauwaert, 
Whitman and Wolff, ‘After Georgia’, p. 12.
25 Halbach, ‘Ungelöste Regionalkonflikte’, p. 14; Report of the 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict 
in Georgia, Vol. II, pp. 203-211.
negotiations on the resolution of the respective 
conflicts with Tbilisi are taking place within the 
framework of the Geneva process and are co-
chaired by the EU, the OSCE and the UN.26
2.4 Nagorno-Karabakh
The self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic 
constitutes one of the most daunting obstacles 
to regional stability in the Southern Caucasus, 
especially due to the persisting state of war 
between the two main parties involved in the 
conflict, namely Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 1989, 
according to the last Soviet census, Nagorno-
Karabakh had a population of almost 200,000 
people, amongst whom 76% were Armenian, 23% 
Azerbaijani and the rest Russian and Kurdish. 
Current estimates place the population size at 
around 130,000, though no official data is available. 
Since the formal cessation of hostilities, Nagorno-
Karabakh and the seven districts that surround it 
remain effectively under Armenian occupation. 
This area constitutes 17% of Azerbaijan’s total 
territory. 27 
The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has its 
roots in the years of the Russian revolution and 
civil war.28 In 1988, in the power vacuum left by 
the dissolving Soviet empire, an ethnic conflict 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan broke out again, 
shortly after the parliament of the Nagorno-
Karabakh Autonomous Oblast in Azerbaijan 
unilaterally decided to join the enclave with 
Armenia. In 1992, following a referendum 
boycotted by the Azerbaijanis, the Armenians of 
Nagorno-Karabakh declared full independence. In 
May 1994, a ceasefire was achieved with Russian 
mediation. However, the six-year conflict left 
more than half a million of internally displaced 
peoples (IDPs) in Azerbaijan, causing one of the 
26 However, negotiations have made little progress so far; see 
N. Mikhelidze, ‘The Geneva talks over Georgia’s territorial 
conflicts: achievements and challenges’, Documenti Istituto Affari 
Internazionali, No. 10/25 (Rome, November 2010).
27 Akçakoca, Vanhauwaert, Whitman and Wolff, ‘After Georgia’, p. 14.
28 Especially in the 1918-20 Armenian-Azerbaijani war over 
border delineation. For a historical discussion of the conflict see 
M. P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and 
Implications (London, 1998).
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most severe refugee crises to date.29 What is more, 
the Nagorno-Karabakh area remains a landmine-
ridden, devastated and largely de-populated 
region.30 
Despite both sides’ official adherence to the 
ceasefire, regular incidents resulting in casualties 
have occurred and Azerbaijan and Armenia 
have involved themselves in a major arms 
race.31 Today, approximately 30,000 Azerbaijani 
and Armenian troops face each other along a 
175-kilometre fault line, which is monitored by 
a mere total of six OSCE observers.32 The latter 
cannot patrol the area without prior notification to 
both conflict sides, which effectively renders their 
efforts to nothing. The volatile truce is far from 
a resolution of the conflict, leaving a possibility 
of an even more deadly war between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan in this context of escalation.33 
Settlement attempts have been in vain so far. 
The so-called “Basic Principles” document, put 
forward by the OSCE mediators in 2007, is the 
most recent settlement proposal. These “Basic 
Principles” require inter alia: the return of the 
territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to 
Azerbaijani control (entailing the complete 
withdrawal of Armenian forces from five out of 
the seven occupied districts and a progressive 
withdrawal from a sixth one); a corridor linking 
Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; an interim status 
for Nagorno-Karabakh for 10-15 years, providing 
guarantees for security and self-governance; future 
determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-
Karabakh through a legally-binding referendum; 
the right of all IDPs and refugees to return to their 
former places of residence; international security 
guarantees that would include a peacekeeping 
operation (numbering around 10,000).34
29 Halbach, ‘Ungelöste Regionalkonflikte’, pp. 18-20;Akçakoca, 
Vanhauwaert, Whitman and Wolff, ‘After Georgia’, pp. 14 and 17. 
30 Akçakoca, Vanhauwaert, Whitman and Wolff, ‘After Georgia’, p. 14.
31 ‘Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War’, International Crisis 
Group Europe Briefing N°60, 8 Feb 2011.
32 A. Paul, ‘Nagorno-Karabakh – A ticking bomb’, European Policy 
Centre (17 September 2010).
33 For a more detailed strategic analysis, see also A. Jackson, ‘The 
Military Balance in Nagorno-Karabakh’, Caucasus update, Issue 
18 (19 January 2009).
34 Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries, press 
release 10 July 2009, available at:http://www.osce.org/item/51152 
Azerbaijan maintains that any resolution must 
entail the restoration of what they consider to 
be the native Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno-
Karabakh, while Armenia favours a self-
determination option for the entity. For the past 15 
years the OSCE Minsk Group, the main (highly 
confidential) conflict settlement discussion 
mechanism co-chaired by Russia, France and the 
United States, has not been able to put enough 
pressure on both sides to make them agree on a 
solution.35
The de facto statehood36 of Nagorno-
Karabakh is dependent on the material support 
of Armenia and its powerful diaspora overseas. 
In 2006, a said 98% of Nagorno-Karabakh voters 
supported a referendum calling for the enclave’s 
independence. The international community, 
however, did not recognize the referendum. In 
terms of internal politics, the separatist entity 
remains under martial law. Although civil rights 
are curbed, the government has tried to hold free 
elections, mainly in order to gain public support in 
the international arena.37 
On the identity and nation-building side, 
Nagorno-Karabakh retains close ties to Armenia, 
as in all other areas of its de facto statehood 
project. What exacerbates the situation and 
(accessed on 12 August 2011).
35 Akçakoca, Vanhauwaert,Whitman and Wolff, ‘After Georgia’, p. 
15; Halbach, ‘Ungeloeste Regionalkonflikte’, pp. 20-21. In the 
most recent round of talks convened in June 2011, no progress 
on the resolution of the dispute over the enclave was achieved; 
E. Barry, ‘Azerbaijan and Armenia Fail to End Enclave Dispute’, 
The New York Times, (24 June 2011). For recent developments 
on the ground, see also ‘Armenia and Azerbaijan: preventing 
war’, International Crisis Group, Europe Briefing No. 60 (8 
February 2011). For a further discussion of the deadlock in 
Azerbaijani-Armenian negotiations and its probable persistence 
in the future see: F. Ismailzade, ‘The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: 
Current Trends and Future Scenarios’, IAI Working Papers 1129 
(November 2011).
36 For our definition of de facto statehood, see p. 2.
37 Freedom House rated these elections as “partly free” and 
considered them as no less democratic than the ones in both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan; nevertheless, the EU has not recognized 
the validity of any election in Nagorno-Karabakh, as was reiterated 
by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the occasion of the 
May 2010 elections. See ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Country Report 
2010’, Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.
cfm?page=22&country=7955&year=2010(accessed on 19 July 
2011) and the Statement by High Representative Catherine 
Ashton on Nagorno-Karabakh, Brussels 21 May 2010, available 
at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/114603.
pdf (accessed on 15 December 2011).
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makes the conflict even more volatile is the 
fact that the Armenian and Azeri populations 
have maintained no contact with each other 
and there were no bottom-up attempts to bridge 
the gap between them. On the contrary, both 
populations have been exposed to and encouraged 
by the intense hate propaganda pursued by their 
respective governments in domestic debates. 
As a consequence, public opinion on both 
sides of the conflict remains sternly opposed 
to any concessions, largely turning settlement 
compromises to unwanted political choices.38 
2.5 Transnistria 
The “Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic” 
(Transnistria in Moldovan; Pridnestrov’e in Russian) 
is located on the thin strip of land on the left bank of 
the river Dniester, wedged between Moldova and 
Ukraine (Figure 2). While it remains a de jure part of 
Moldova, it has been a de facto separate state entity 
for 20 years – since its declaration of independence 
on 27 August 1991. Out of all the post-Soviet conflict 
zones, the term “frozen conflict” is most fitting here, 
as there have been no reports of incidents resulting 
in casualties since the ceasefire in July 1992.39 
Transnistria declared independence from 
Moldova merely a day before the Moldovan 
declaration of independence from the USSR.40 
However, Transnistrian leaders did not manage to 
secure international recognition or reach a deal with 
the parent state on secession. The military conflict 
itself was directly spurred by Chisinau’s decision 
to establish Moldovan as the state language of the 
new republic. Following months of skirmishes, in 
the spring of 1992 Moldovan forces attempted to 
retake the left bank of the Dniester River, triggering 
a full-fledged war and a prompt intervention by the 
Russian army. By the summer of 1992, a ceasefire 
was signed and the conflict “froze”, basically in an 
“as-is” form up to this day.41
38 Akçakoca, Vanhauwaert, Whitman and Wolff, ‘After Georgia’, 
pp. 15-16. 
39 S. Wolff, ‘The Prospects of a Sustainable Conflict Settlement for 
Transnistria’, Research Seminar, 9 February 2011, p. 1.
40 Blakkisrud and Kolstø, ‘From Secessionist Conflict Toward a 
Functioning State: Processes of State- and Nation-Building in 
Transnistria’, p. 183.
41 Wolff, ‘The Prospects of a Sustainable Conflict Settlement for 
Currently, there are approximately 1,200 
Russian troops in Transnistria, namely the 
remnant of the former Soviet 14th army, as well 
as large amounts of Soviet-time ammunition. 
Since the 1992 war, there have been various 
conflict settlement attempts. On the whole, all of 
the proposals advocated the return of Transnistria 
to Moldova, and either side rejected all. Any 
agreement in the case of the Transnistrian conflict 
would have to entail the resolution of a number of 
distinct but interconnected issues.42 The proposals 
tabled in the years 1993-2007, by actors ranging 
from the Conference on Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (CSCE), through Ukrainian and 
Russian politicians, to the Moldovan side, have 
addressed questions such as the distribution of 
powers, potential federalism, external and internal 
guarantees for compliance and the permission of 
secession in the case of a Moldovan merge with 
Romania43. The current round of negotiations in 
a 5+2 format, including Moldova, Transnistria, 
Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE, as well as the EU and 
the US as observers, has not yielded any solutions 
so far.44
Transnistria remains a “net importer” of 
security, as a result of Moscow’s long-standing 
involvement in the conflict. Its de facto statehood 
ultimately depends on Russia’s willingness 
to renew its security guarantee.45 In terms of 
securing physical territorial control, Transnistrian 
authorities have managed to maintain a fixed 
and deliberately delineated border, as well as 
Transnistria’, p. 2.
42 Ibid.
43 Report No. 13 by the CSCE Mission to Moldova (13 November 
1993), available at http://www.osce.org/moldova/42307 (accessed 
on 17 August 2011); Kozak Memorandum, available in Russian 
at http://www.regnum.ru/news/458547.html (accessed on 17 
August 2011); Proposals and recommendations of the mediators 
from the OSCE, the Russian Federation, Ukraine with regards 
to the Transdniestrian settlement, (13 February 2004), available 
at http://www.osce.org/moldova/23585 (accessed on 17 August 
2011); Ukrainian Plan of 2005 (Plan for the settlement of the 
Transdniestrian problem), available at http://www.stefanwolff.
com/files/Ukrainian-Plan.pdf (accessed on 17 August 2011); 
Moldovan Framework Law 2005 (law On Fundamental 
Regulations of the Special Legal Status of Settlements on the Left 
Bank of the River Nistru (Transnistria), 22 July 2005). 
44 Akçakoca, Vanhauwaert, Whitman and Wolff, ‘After Georgia’, p. 20.
45 Blakkisrud and Kolstø, ‘From Secessionist Conflict Toward a 
Functioning State’, p. 186.
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full control over the territory within it. The Joint 
Control Commission, a trilateral force consisting 
of Russian, Moldovan and Transnistrian security 
and peacekeeping forces with a common 
command structure, has been established to 
patrol the Transnistrian-Moldovan frontier areas. 
In practical terms, border control carried out in 
conjunction with external actors has helped to 
entrench the Transnistrian territorial status quo. 
Initially, the Transnistrian-Ukrainian border was 
given less attention. As a result, it became a hub 
for the lucrative market of smuggling, trafficking 
of human beings, drugs and weapons. Looking 
back, however, the reports about the dire border 
situation seem to have been overblown and 
exaggerated from the start.46 
Although Transnistria is not recognized 
internationally by any state besides the other three 
46 Blakkisrud and Kolstø, ‘From Secessionist Conflict Toward a 
Functioning State’, pp. 187-188.
separatist entities discussed in this article, it has 
established and consolidated state-like features. 
The Transnistrian political system is highly 
centralized, with the balance of power shifted 
towards the presidency. Igor Smirnov has been the 
president of Transnistria since 1990, winning four 
consecutive presidential elections with Moscow’s 
support. In December 2011, however, after 
21 years of rule, he was defeated by Yevgeniy 
Shevchuk – albeit a “new face”, arguably no 
less Russia-oriented. Moscow seems to have 
abandoned Smirnov, perhaps seeking a renewed 
momentum in international negotiations.47 
47 Akçakoca, Vanhauwaert, Whitman and Wolff, ‘After Georgia’, p. 
17; A. Racz, ‘Russian approaches to the ‘common neighbourhood: 
change or preservation of the status quo?’, SPES Policy Papers 
(November 2010), p. 13; Wolff, ‘The Prospects of a Sustainable 
Conflict Settlement for Transnistria’, pp. 2-5. For a discussion 
of the 2011 Transnistrian presidential elections see: V. Socor, 
‘Smirnov out, Shevchuk in: A Short-Term Win-Win for Moscow 
in Transnistria’, Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol.9 Issue 18 (26 January 
2012).
Figure 2: Transnistria and Moldova. 
http://upload.moldova.org/map/moldova_map_transnistria.jpg
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The general sentiment that Moldovans are 
much worse off economically pervades among 
Transnistrians. Moreover, significant political and 
economic interest groups have a stake and a say in 
the Transnistrian independence bid. Transnistrian 
political elites have been the major beneficiaries 
of the “crony privatization” of the major industrial 
plants, which dominate the country’s economy. 
Furthermore, Russia remains the primary export 
market, as well as the foremost provider of loans 
and subsidies. Thus, the main rationale for the 
Transnistrian independence bid remains economic. 
There have been no significant tensions among the 
Moldovan, Russian and Ukrainian ethnic groups, 
each of which constitutes approximately one third 
of the population.
3. The European Union‘s involve-
ment in the protracted conflicts
3.1 Instruments and policies
The European Union started to look for a role 
in the resolution of the four conflicts in the late 
1990s. In 1998, the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) between the EU and the 
Republic of Moldova entered into force, followed 
by similar PCAs with Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia the year after. However, these documents 
dealt mainly with market reforms and the 
harmonization of national legislation with EU 
legislation, while the resolution of the conflicts did 
not feature prominently. The PCA with Moldova 
did not include any reference to the Transnistrian 
conflict, even though it recognized Moldova’s 
territorial integrity in the preamble.48 The PCAs 
with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan only stated 
that “Dialogue may take place on a regional basis, 
with a view to contributing towards the resolution 
of regional conflicts and tensions”.49 Abkhazia, 
48 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Moldova, of the other part, available at http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21998A0624
%2801%29:EN:HTML (accessed on 19 July 2011).
49 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and 
Georgia, of the other part, available at http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21999A0804(0
1):EN:HTML (accessed on 19 July 2011); Partnership and 
South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh were not 
even mentioned and no concrete guidelines were 
provided for a comprehensive EU strategy on 
conflict resolution in the region. This approach 
corresponded to the EU’s intention to prioritize 
economic transition in post-Soviet states in the 
late 1990s and postpone confrontation with the 
complex challenges posed by unresolved conflicts 
to a later stage. 
During the following decade, Brussels 
recognized the importance of solving the conflicts, 
both for the stability of post-Soviet countries and 
for its own security and strategic interests, as 
seen in the EU conflict resolution initiatives as 
well as the voiced objectives in terms of energy 
policy. Consequently, the Union attempted to step 
up its role in the resolution of the four protracted 
conflicts under analysis. In July 2003, a Special 
Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus, 
Peter Semneby, was appointed. In March 2005, a 
EUSR for Moldova was also appointed and given 
the task of streamlining EU efforts within the 
5+2 negotiation framework, in which the Union 
is involved as an observer.Despite the EUSR’s 
efforts aimed at contributing to conflict resolution, 
they achieved little in this respect.50 
The EUSR’s weak performance highlighted 
the gap between the EU’s declared aim of playing 
a major role in conflict resolution in the region 
and its limited power on the ground. The Union’s 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of 
Armenia, of the other part, available at http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21999A0909%280
1%29:EN:HTML (accessed on 19 July 2011); Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, of the other part, available at http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21999A0917%2801
%29:EN:HTML (accessed on 19 July 2011). 
50 Their weak performance may be one of the reasons why Catherine 
Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, planned to abolish both posts in 2010; A. 
Lobjakas, ‘EU Plans To Scrap South Caucasus, Moldova Envoys’, 
Radio Free Europe (31 May 2010), available at http://www.rferl.
org/content/EU_Plans_To_Scrap_South_Caucasus_Moldova_
Envoys/2057672.html (accessed on 19 July 2011). Eventually, 
the post of EUSR for the South Caucasus was merged with the 
one of EUSR for the crisis in Georgia, created in 2008,; Philippe 
Lefort took over both positions. The post of EUSR for Moldova 
was abolished. See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/
foreign-policy/eu-special-representatives?lang=ga (accessed on 9 
February 2012).
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weak leverage on the conflicting parties and the 
lack of coordination between Brussels and its 
representatives in the conflict regions weakened 
the EU’s diplomatic position. These problems 
were compounded by the lack of internal 
coherence in the EU when addressing the four 
protracted conflicts, which was caused by the 
member states’ diverging interests and priorities, 
particularly with regard to Russia.51 Consequently, 
the EUSRs limited themselves to supporting 
existing mediation efforts, proving that the EU 
lacked a proactive strategy for conflict resolution. 
This also emerged clearly in the European 
Security Strategy (ESS), published in December 
2003. The ESS argues that the EU intends to make 
sure that its neighbourhood is peaceful and well 
governed. However, the document fails to specify 
a clear strategy to achieve this objective; it only 
includes vague statements on “dealing with the 
older problems of regional conflict” in order to 
“tackle the often elusive new threats”.52 
The Eastern enlargement of 2004 and the 
shifting of the EU’s borders eastwards prompted 
the Union to adopt another policy toward its 
new neighbourhood, which now geographically 
included the four conflicts under analysis. The 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was 
launched in 2004 and further developed through 
the adoption of bilateral Action Plans by the Union 
and each of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Moldova between February 2005 and November 
51 For instance, in 2006 nine EU member states (Cyprus, Greece, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, France, Slovakia, Finland and Portugal) 
opposed plans for a peace support operation in Moldova in order 
not to alienate Russia, which opposes further EU involvement 
in the region. In addition, the Mediterranean member states 
also feared a diversion of limited EU foreign policy resources 
from the Southern to the Eastern neighbourhood. For these and 
further examples of divergent interests, see N. Popescu, ‘EU and 
the Eastern neighbourhood: reluctant involvement in conflict 
resolution’, European Foreign Affairs Review, No. 14, pp. 463-464.
52 A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy 
(12 December 2003), p. 4, available at http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/european-security-strategy.
aspx?lang=en (accessed on 19 July 2011). The Report on the 
Implementation of the European Security Strategy, published 
in December 2008, specified that the EU’s involvement in the 
protracted conflicts would include leading the Geneva Process 
and active participation in the 5+2 negotiations on Transnistria, 
see http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/documents/en/081211_EU%20
Security%20Strategy.pdf (accessed on 10 February 2012), p. 6.
2006.53 The Action Plans addressed each conflict 
more precisely than the PCAs, which confirmed 
the EU’s willingness to acquire a more prominent 
role in conflict resolution. However, lack of 
leverage, internal coherence and coordination 
continued to undermine the Union’s policies, hence 
there was no substantial progress on the ground. 
Furthermore, the Action Plans did not establish a 
coherent EU policy towards the conflicts. Due to 
the EU’s attempts to accommodate the interests 
of its various ENP partners, the Action Plans 
were even contradictory in some respects. Most 
notably, the EU-Azerbaijan Action Plan included a 
reference to the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, 
while the EU-Armenia Action Plan stressed the 
hardly reconcilable principle of self-determination 
of peoples as a priority in the resolution of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.54
The most visible EU effort on the ground 
during this phase was the deployment of a border 
assistance mission, EUBAM, in November 
2005, at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. The 
mission was given the task of monitoring 1,222 
kilometres of borders, including 472 kilometres of 
Transnistrian-Ukrainian frontier. The monitoring 
of this area was particularly important, as it 
significantly decreased Transnistrian revenues 
from smuggling and trafficking activities.55 The 
EU deployed another monitoring mission in 
Georgia (EUMM) in September 2008, following 
the August crisis in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
(see Figure 3). Although the mission does not 
have access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it 
contributes to preventing the re-escalation of the 
conflict thanks to its presence on the Georgian 
side of the border.56
53 All Action Plans and the most recent progress reports can be 
found on the European Commission website, see http://ec.europa.
eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm#2 (accessed on 19 July 2011).
54 EU-Azerbaijan Action Plan, p. 1; EU-Armenia Action Plan, p. 9.
55 Popescu, ‘EU and the Eastern neighbourhood’, p. 462. For a 
detailed analysis of EUBAM, see G. Dura, ‘The EU Border 
Assistance Mission to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine’, in 
G. Grevi, D. Kelly and D. Keohane (eds.), European Security and 
Defence Policy. The first 10 years (Paris, 2009), pp. 275-286.
56 An analysis of EUMM’s deployment and the early stages of 
its operation is available in S. Fischer, ‘EUMM Georgia. The 
European Monitoring Mission in Georgia’, in G. Grevi, D. Kelly 
and D. Keohane (eds.), European Security and Defence Policy. 
The first 10 years (Paris, 2009), pp. 379-390.
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Following the August 2008 crisis, the EU has 
also become a co-chair of the negotiations for 
the resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. A Special Representative for the 
Crisis in Georgia, Pierre Morel, was appointed 
and given inter alia the task of representing the 
EU’s position in the negotiations. However, 
except for these modest measures, which were 
taken in the immediate aftermath of the August 
2008 crisis, the EU has not developed any new 
effective policies or instruments to tackle the four 
conflicts under analysis.57 The recent review of 
the ENP only summarized very shortly the efforts 
undertaken by the EU so far, without providing 
substantial guidelines on future policies.58 In the 
final document, the lack of specific measures to 
tackle protracted conflicts in the neighbourhood 
constituted another missed opportunity for the EU 
to address the issue adequately and acquire a more 
prominent role in conflict resolution. Furthermore, 
the technicalities related to the restructuring of the 
EU’s external relations services, particularly the 
establishment of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), have not helped to strengthen 
the EU’s focus on the four conflicts.59 In February 
2011, the post of EUSR for Moldova was 
abolished, while in September the posts of EUSR 
for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia 
were merged and taken over by Philippe Lefort.
57 The Eastern Partnership constitutes no exception in this respect. 
The Prague Eastern Partnership summit of May 2009 failed to 
address the issue of protracted conflicts adequately, as shown by 
the lack of references to them in the Joint Declaration – see http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/
en/er/107589.pdf. The Joint Declaration of the Warsaw Eastern 
Partnership summit of September 2011 stressed the importance of 
EUMM’s presence on the ground and welcomed the appointment 
of a new EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, 
as well as the decision to resume 5+2 negotiations on Transnistria. 
However, it does not include any significant new policy proposals 
for the EU to address the protracted conflicts; see http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
ec/124843.pdf.
58 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions, ‘A new response to a changing Neighbourhood’ 
(Brussels, 25 May 2011), pp. 5-6, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf (accessed on 19 July 2011).
59 Lobjakas, ‘EU Plans To Scrap South Caucasus, Moldova Envoys.’
3.2 Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Although the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts 
have a different history and developed independent 
of each other, the EU has always had a single 
approach to both of them. For this reason, EU 
policies towards the two conflicts shall be analyzed 
together. EU involvement in the Abkhaz and 
South Ossetian conflicts during the period 1992-
July 2008 gradually became more significant. 
However, it was always too weak to play a decisive 
role in conflict resolution and conflict prevention. 
As emerges from the bilateral treaties between the 
Union and Georgia, the EU dealt with the conflicts 
merely as part of its broader relations with Tbilisi, 
which downplayed their complexity and the actual 
strength of separatist forces in Tskhinvali and 
Sukhumi.60
In November 2006 a bilateral ENP Action Plan 
between the EU and Georgia was adopted for the 
following five years. The Action Plan defined 
conflict resolution as one of the EU’s priorities 
for action and addressed the Abkhaz and South 
Ossetian conflicts directly. Point 4.2 of the General 
Objectives and Action advocated sustained efforts 
towards peaceful resolution of the conflicts by 
stepping up EU support to the existing UN and 
OSCE negotiation mechanisms. Furthermore, 
Priority Area 6 proposed to grant economic 
assistance depending on progress in conflict 
settlement, accelerate the demilitarization process, 
implement agreements previously achieved and 
include the issue of Georgia’s internal conflicts in 
the dialogue between the EU and Russia.61 
The Action Plan’s outright and unconditional 
support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity constituted an unequivocal pro-
Georgian bias. It also ignored the reality on the 
ground, notably the fact that the Abkhazians and 
South Ossetians had set up de facto independent 
institutions. In addition, the Action Plan focused 
mainly on political and economic transformation 
rather than on conflict settlement. This meant 
that, in order not to alienate Russia and to 
avoid direct involvement in the tense conflict 
60 Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on 
the Conflict in Georgia, Vol. II, p. 59.
61 EU-Georgia Action Plan, pp. 10 and 17.
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resolution talks, the EU practically opted for a 
background role in conflict resolution, supporting 
negotiations without actively participating in 
them.62 On the ground, the Russia-dominated 
peacekeeping forces played the leading role. Due 
to disagreements among its member states, the 
EU was not even able to take up the functions 
of an OSCE border monitoring mission on the 
Georgian-Russian border when Moscow vetoed 
the extension of its mandate. Several EU member 
states, including France, Germany and Italy, 
feared that deploying a EU mission in the area 
would lead to a deterioration of relations with 
Russia.63 
Thus, on the eve of the August 2008 crisis 
the EU had neither a coherent policy, nor 
sufficient presence on the ground to influence 
events. The EU’s leverage on Georgia, an ENP 
partner, was further diminished by the stance of 
the US government. Washington’s apparently 
unconditional support for Saakashvili emboldened 
the Georgian president to seek a military solution 
of the conflict and ignore proposals for a peaceful 
settlement coming from the EU. The visit of Javier 
Solana, High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), to both 
Tbilisi and Sukhumi was all that the EU was able 
to achieve in the months preceding the crisis.64 
Furthermore, disagreements within the Union 
contributed to the failure of the peace plan for 
Abkhazia presented by German foreign minister 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier in mid-July 2008. Both 
in the run-up to and during the August 2008 war, 
the UK and the Central-Eastern European member 
states advocated a tougher stance towards Russia. 
This was particularly true of Poland and the Baltic 
States, which had strained bilateral relations 
with Moscow and were willing to confront the 
Kremlin from a stronger, EU-wide diplomatic 
62 German, ‘The Caucasus and energy security’, Caucasus Review 
of International Affairs, Vol. 2 No. 2 (2008), p. 362.
63 Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission 
on the Conflict in Georgia, Vol. II, p. 58; R. Eggleston, ‘Russia/
Georgia: Moscow vetoes OSCE’s border monitoring mission’, 
Radio Free Europe (30 December 2004), available at http://www.
rferl.org/content/article/1056632.html (accessed on 9 August 
2011); Popescu, ‘EU and the Eastern neighbourhood’, pp. 465-466.
64 Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on 
the Conflict in Georgia, Vol. II, pp. 56-59.
position.65 Sarkozy’s relative success in mediating 
the ceasefire in August was due to the fact that he 
acted out of his own initiative, without waiting 
for the formulation of a common EU position, 
which would have been very difficult to attain. 
Sarkozy, acting also in its function of EU Council 
President, flew to Moscow on 12 August 2008 and 
drafted the ceasefire plan together with Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev, based on a proposal 
that had been prepared in Paris.66 
Russia’s approval of the French initiative and 
the latter’s pliability to Moscow’s demands also 
facilitated the process. The Six-Point Ceasefire 
Agreement did not include any reference to 
Georgian territorial integrity, which the EU had 
been keen to stress until then, in order not to 
anger the Russians.67 What is more, Russia did not 
implement the agreement in a timely manner and 
recognized the independence of both Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia on 26 August 2008. The EU 
responded by freezing the negotiations on a 
new partnership agreement with Russia, but did 
not impose additional sanctions, which would 
have been detrimental for its own commercial 
and energy security interests. Relations with 
the Kremlin were normalized in November 
2008, following the withdrawal of Russian 
troops from almost all uncontested Georgian 
territory. Nonetheless, Moscow simultaneously 
consolidated its military presence in both 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which the EU merely 
accepted as a fait accompli.68
On 15 September 2008, the Council of the 
European Union established a civilian mission, 
the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, in order 
65 A. Schmidt-Felzmann, ‘All for one ? EU member states and the 
Union’s common policy towards the Russian Federation’, Journal 
of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2008), pp. 
169-187.
66 O. Kurtbag, ‘EU’s response to the Georgia crisis: an active 
peace broker or a confused and divided actor?’, Central Asian 
and Caucasian Studies, Vol. 3 No. 6 (2008), pp. 60-62 and 67; 
T. Forsberg and A. Seppo, ‘The Russo-Georgian war and EU 
mediation’, in R. Kanet (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy in the 
21st Century (Basingstoke, 2011), pp. 126-127; M. Volkhonskiy, 
‘Medvedev-Sarkozy’s six points: the diplomatic aspect of the 
South Ossetian settlement’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 
58-59, No. 4-5 (2009), pp. 203-206.
67 M. Volkhonskiy, ‘Medvedev-Sarkozy’s six points’, pp. 203-206.
68 Forsberg and Seppo, ‘The Russo-Georgian war and EU 
mediation’, pp. 126-127.
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to supervise the withdrawal of Russian troops 
from the areas adjacent to Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.69 EUMM was also given the tasks of 
monitoring the conflicting parties’ behaviour 
and their full compliance with the Six-Point 
Agreement, implementing confidence-building 
measures and reporting events to Brussels.70 200 
monitors were deployed on Georgian territory by 
1 October; this was the fastest deployment in the 
history of European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) missions. EUMM signed a memorandum 
of understanding with Georgia, in which Tbilisi 
pledged to give prior notification if it intended 
to deploy police forces in the area adjacent to 
the administrative border with the breakaway 
69 Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP (15 September 2008), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=OJ:L:2008:248: 0026:0031:EN:PDF (accessed on 10 
August 2011).
70 Council Joint Actions 2008/736/CFSP (15 September 2008) and 
2009/572/CFSP (27 July 2009), available at: http://www.eumm.
eu/en/about_eumm/legalbasis (accessed on 9 August 2011).
provinces. Georgia also agreed to refrain from 
large movements of troops and heavy equipment 
in this area and allowed EUMM to inspect 
Georgian army sites.71 
The swift deployment of EUMM was a rare 
show of internal unity from the EU. This was 
the result of the member states’ agreement on the 
necessity to quickly deploy the mission in order 
to defuse tensions. The monitoring activities of 
the mission have contributed to prevent a new 
escalation of the conflict and provide Brussels 
with first-hand information. However, the 
mission’s work is hampered by lack of access 
to the Abkhaz and South Ossetian side of the 
border. Abkhazia and South Ossetia will not grant 
access to EUMM as long as the EU continues 
to support unconditionally Georgia’s territorial 
integrity, which in turn is a fundamental condition 
for Tbilisi to accept the mission’s deployment.72 
71 Fischer, ‘The European Monitoring Mission in Georgia’, pp. 379-389.
72 The spokesperson of High Representative Catherine Ashton 
Figure 3: EU presence in the Georgian region. 
http://www.eumm.eu/data/image_db_innova/new_map_2010_jan_1.jpg
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Furthermore, Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
perceive EUMM as being closer to Tbilisi than 
UNOMIG and the OSCE mission, which were 
under considerable Russian influence. In both 
breakaway provinces, attitudes to the EU have 
changed radically since August 2008. Prior to 
the crisis, the Abkhaz leadership was interested 
in establishing closer relations with Brussels, 
but Western public statements during the war 
aroused criticism in Abkhazia and EUMM is now 
perceived as supporting the West’s pro-Georgia 
policy.73 
3.3 Nagorno-Karabakh 
Arguably, out of the four protracted conflicts 
discussed in this article the EU has shown least 
determination and proactive focus on the resolution 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Although Catherine 
Ashton has recently claimed that “the peaceful 
settlement of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict is a 
key strategic interest of the European Union”74, the 
EU still has no policy towards the conflict.75 Given 
that the status of this enclave remains the most 
volatile of all the protracted conflicts in the EU’s 
eastern neighbourhood, limited EU engagement 
adds to the persisting impasse in the region. This 
lack of progress by the EU is a result of several 
developments. To begin with, the EU has no direct 
access to the negotiations of the OSCE Minsk 
Group and has to rely on information provided 
reiterated the EU’s support to the territorial integrity of Georgia 
in two statements in August and November 2011. On these 
occasions, he also stated that the EU did not recognize the validity 
of the elections that took place in Abkhazia on 27 August 2011 
and in South Ossetia on 13 November 2011; see Statement by 
the spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton 
on the elections in the breakaway region of Abkhazia in Georgia, 
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/
docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/124445.pdf, and Statement by the 
spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton 
on the elections in the breakaway region of South Ossetia in 
Georgia, 14 November 2011, available at http://www.eeas.
europa.eu/delegations/russia/press_corner/all_news/news/2011/ 
20111114_01_en.htm (accessed on 15 December 2011).
73 Fischer, ‘The European Monitoring Mission in Georgia’, pp. 386-
389; B. Harzl, A. Engl and G. von Toggenburg, Guidelines and 
recommendations for EU conflict prevention and management: 
the case of the South Caucasus (Bolzano, 2008), p. 33.
74 Speech by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, Strasbourg, 
6 July 2011, available at http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/
article_11195_en.htm (accessed on 14 December 2011).
75 Popescu, ‘EU and the Eastern neighbourhood’, p. 471.
by the French co-chair.76 Therefore, the EU as 
a whole can give no direct input to the conflict 
resolution mechanism. Instead, Brussels has been 
trying to include references to the resolution of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within its respective 
Action Plans with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
However, the two Action Plans are 
contradictory due to the EU’s attempt to 
accommodate the interests of two partners on 
which it has very limited leverage. Although the 
Action Plan for Azerbaijan lists the resolution of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as the topmost 
priority for action, the Action Plan for Armenia 
puts the resolution of the conflict as only the 
seventh priority (out of eight). What is more, 
while “Priority area 7” of the EU-Armenia 
Action Plan recommends the application of the 
principle of self-determination of peoples in 
the peaceful solution for Nagorno-Karabakh, 
the “Introduction” to the EU-Azerbaijan Action 
Plan clearly commits both parties to “territorial 
integrity and the inviolability of internationally 
recognized borders.”77 These two commitments 
stand in contradiction and the EU has not specified 
how they can be reconciled. In addition to this, 
such an approach is also inconsistent with the EU 
support for Moldovan and Georgian territorial 
integrity in the face of their irredentist conflicts.
Moreover, the EU has a very weak negotiating 
position with regards to Azerbaijan, which is a key 
supplier and transit country for the EU-sponsored 
southern energy corridor. Baku could make its 
participation in the energy corridor conditional 
to obtaining EU’s support on Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Thus, Brussels has a growing need to actively 
participate in the resolution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, not least because the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline runs merely 15 kilometers 
away from the conflict fault line.78 Nevertheless, 
concerns of souring relations with the conflicting 
parties and repeated delays in the implementation 
of the southern energy corridor have left EU’s 
policies in the region in an impasse. The current 
76 Akçakoca, Vanhauwaert, Whitman and Wolff, ‘After Georgia’, 
pp. 15 and 24.
77 EU-Azerbaijan Action Plan, p. 1; EU-Armenia Action Plan, p. 9.
78 Akçakoca, Vanhauwaert, Whitman and Wolff, ‘After 
Georgia’, p. 25.
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EU inaction has left Azerbaijan, which is 
arguably the main loser in the status quo, feeling 
alienated and predisposed to a “siege mentality”. 
Consequently, Baku has opposed EUSR visits 
to Nagorno-Karabakh for a number of years. 
Azerbaijan objects to greater EU involvement, lest 
it consolidates the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities 
and weakens the blockade on Armenia.79 
While the EU has been unable to propose 
its own peace plan for Nagorno-Karabakh, the 
“Document on Basic Principles”, which has 
been updated and reconfirmed in 2008 and 
2009, remains the main settlement proposal to 
date.80 Should Armenia and Azerbaijan endorse 
these “Basic Principles”, the drafting of a 
comprehensive settlement is envisaged for the 
future. Accordingly, in both the Armenian and 
the Azerbaijani Action Plans, the EU calls for a 
strengthened commitment to the OSCE Minsk 
group negotiations on the basis of the “Basic 
Principles”. However, disagreement on the final 
status of Nagorno-Karabakh persists, with neither 
side willing to compromise their positions and 
the EU unable to propose effective incentives for 
conflict resolution.
Furthermore, while Russia has stepped up its 
mediating efforts (particularly since 2008), the 
EU has not followed suit and has not managed 
to secure any role of significance in the conflict 
settlement discussions, remaining a passive 
bystander. While the EU has attempted to play 
a more important role in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, it 
has remained completely passive with regard to 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Prague EU 
Summit of May 2009, which officially launched 
the Eastern Partnership, also missed another 
chance of putting pressure for talks between 
Presidents Sargsyan of Armenia and Aliyev of 
Azerbaijan. Further OSCE Minsk Group talks 
during the Astana OSCE Summit in 2010 have 
shown how far apart the warring sides actually are 
and yielded no positive outcome.
79 Popescu, ‘EU and the Eastern neighbourhood’, p. 472.
80 Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries, 
Press release (10 July 2009), available at: http://www.osce.org/
item/51152 (accessed on 12 August 2011).
3.4 Transnistria 
The conflict between Transnistria and Moldova 
has seen the highest and most intensive level of 
EU involvement in settlement efforts. Whether for 
reasons of geographical proximity, or due to the fact 
that Moldova has repeatedly asked for a EU role 
in conflict resolution mechanisms, Brussels has 
been directly implicated in the internationalization 
of the peacekeeping format. Accordingly, there 
is a EU Special Representative and a EU border 
assistance mission in Moldova; Brussels is also 
involved in the 5+2 negotiation format.81 Even 
so, the EU has not played a more significant role 
in the negotiations, where it only has observer 
status. Due to internal divisions and the reluctance 
of several member states to challenge Moscow’s 
position, the EU has not proposed any plan for 
the resolution of the conflict comparable to those 
proposed by Russia in 2003 or by Ukraine in 2005. 
Furthermore, the EUSR’s proposal to pressure 
Russia to accept a joint EU-Russian peacekeeping 
operation was opposed by several EU member 
states that feared alienating the Kremlin.82
As far as the EU’s direct impact on the ground 
is concerned, the work of EUBAM has involved 
120 border and customs experts (see Figure 4). 
In the years since its inception, EUBAM has 
been combating cross-border crime and customs 
fraud through confidence-building measures, the 
simplification of border crossing, and the support 
for organizational development, among others.83 
Its success, as judged from its scope, should not be 
underestimated. The deployment of EUBAM has 
also had economic consequences for Transnistria, 
notably the reduction of the income available to 
the separatist authorities from smuggling and 
trafficking. This development, coupled with the 
effects of the financial crisis, resulted in Tiraspol 
reaching near-bankruptcy and made it depend 
81 See above, pp. 13 and 15-16.
82 L. Kuzmicheva, ‘Unresolved conflicts in the common 
neighbourhood: a comparative analysis of EU and Russian 
policies’, SPES Policy Papers, January 2011, p. 21; Popescu, ‘EU 
and the Eastern neighbourhood’, pp. 463-464.
83 EUBAM IMPACT, European Union Border Assistance Mission 
(2005-2010), available at: http://www.eubam.org/en/quick/
impact (accessed on 11 August 2011). 
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even more on Russian financial help.84 In turn, 
Moscow’s increased economic role further 
emphasized the reality that any settlement the 
EU might want to see in the region would have to 
include Russian input.
Furthermore, given the relevance of economic 
factors to conflict resolution in Transnistria,85 the 
EU has been much more adept at administering 
its economic pressure than in the case of other 
protracted conflicts. For instance, it has abolished 
tariffs on about 12,000 Moldovan products 
through the Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP) 
agreement, thereby creating new incentives for 
Transnistrian business to cooperate with the 
Moldovan side. What is more, EU pressure on 
Ukraine only to accept Transnistrian exports 
carrying Moldovan customs stamps has resulted 
in the registration of some 95% of Transnistrian 
economic activity as Moldovan companies in 
order to benefit from the ATP concessions.86 As 
a result, Transnistrian exports to the EU, flowing 
thanks to Moldovan licenses, rose by 59% 
between the years 2006-2008.87
In addition, the EU has included references 
to the Transnistrian conflict in its Action Plan for 
Moldova. The document states as one of its key 
objectives the support of a “viable solution to the 
Transnistria conflict” and, accordingly, sustained 
efforts for such a resolution are listed as the 
first priority for action.88 However, the Action 
Plan simultaneously underlines the territorial 
integrity of Moldova “within its internationally 
recognized borders” and a system of efficient and 
effective border management “on all sectors of 
the Moldovan border including the Transnistrian 
sector.”89 Therefore, the EU commitment to 
Moldova concerning the status quo border 
situation paradoxically strengthens Transnistrian 
authorities, which control a long section of 
84 Akçakoca, Vanhauwaert, Whitman and Wolff, ‘After Georgia’, p. 13.
85 See above, p. 14. Most of the Moldovan heavy industry is located 
in Transnistria, which, in turn, depends on the export of its 
industrial products; Akçakoca, Vanhauwaert, Whitman and Wolff, 
‘After Georgia’, p. 13.
86 Akçakoca, Vanhauwaert, Whitman and Wolff, ‘After Georgia’, p. 13.
87 Popescu, ‘EU and the Eastern neighbourhood’, p. 462.
88 EU-Moldova Action Plan, pp. 1 and 3.
89 EU-Moldova Action Plan, pp. 4 and 11.
Moldova’s external borders. Furthermore, 
the persistent stress on, and call for further 
negotiations within already-existing formats 
precludes the EU from taking any initiative on 
its own and increasing its mediating role outside 
those structures.90 Thus, despite having displayed 
increased efforts in conflict management, the EU 
has by no means exhausted its options for action 
in this conflict, as in all others discussed here. 
90 High Representative Catherine Ashton reiterated the EU’s 
commitment to the 5+2 negotiation format in May 2010 and 
September 2011, in spite of the scarce results that this forum 
has produced so far; see Statement by High Representative 
Catherine Ashton on Moldova/Transnistria, Brussels, 17 May 
2010, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/114472.pdf and Statement 
by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the 
resumption of official negotiations on the settlement of the 
Transnistria conflict, 22 September 2011, available at http://www.
eeas.europa.eu/ delegations/moldova/press_corner/all_news/
news/2011/20110923_en.htm (accessed on 15 December 2011).
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Figure 4: EU presence in Transnistria. 
http://www.enpi-info.eu/img/publications/eubampresspack.jpg
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4. Conclusion and recommendations
This analysis has shown that the European Union 
plays a marginal role in all the four protracted 
conflicts under investigation, particularly if 
compared to the role played by Russia. The EU 
is excluded from negotiations on the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, has no access to Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia and, despite its considerable 
economic and diplomatic leverage on Moldova and 
Transnistria, has been unable to propose a peace 
plan for the Transnistrian conflict. For the most 
part, the relevant objectives and priorities stated 
in bilateral Action Plans with partner countries 
have remained on paper only, mostly due to the 
EU’s scarce leverage on the conflicting parties, 
internal divisions among EU member states and 
the fear of souring relations with Russia. When 
the EU undertook concrete action, results were 
mixed. The civilian missions deployed in Georgia 
and Moldova helped defuse tensions and monitor 
borders but, in terms of conflict resolution, they 
were mere ad hoc palliatives. EU’s diplomatic 
efforts to solve the conflicts, both on the ground, 
via the EUSRs and in the international arena, have 
been inadequate to achieve the objectives that the 
Union set out in its Action Plans with the relevant 
ENP partners.
The most recent developments concerning 
the ENP suggest that the Union will not step 
up its conflict resolution efforts in the post-
Soviet space in the foreseeable future. The paper 
issued by the Commission as a revision of the 
ENP general approach, “A new response to a 
changing neighbourhood”, merely states that 
“EU geopolitical, economic and security interests 
are directly affected by continuing instability” 
and that Brussels is committed to confidence-
building measures and to developing post-
conflict reconstruction scenarios.91 Once again, an 
opportunity was missed to provide concrete and 
specific guidelines for an EU approach to conflict 
settlement.
As some observers have noted, if the EU wants 
91 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions, ‘A new response to a changing Neighbourhood’, 
pp. 5-6.
to achieve its stated objectives and play a role 
in the resolution of the four protracted conflicts, 
it will need a coherent “Eastern Neighbourhood 
Conflict Prevention and Resolution Strategy”, 
clearly defining its interests, a common strategy 
and concrete road maps for implementation.92 
Furthermore, the EU will have to start a dialogue 
with the authorities of the de facto states. By 
avoiding diplomatic contacts and refusing to 
establish any economic relations, the EU will only 
push these entities further into a condition of total 
economic and political dependence on Russia.
As far as Abkhazia and South Ossetia are 
concerned, the EU should accept the fact that their 
independence and separation from Georgia is at 
this point irreversible. Russia will not withdraw its 
recognition of both entities and, given Moscow’s 
preeminence in the region, it is unlikely that 
any other actor will challenge the status quo by 
either political or military means. In addition, 
maintaining a confrontational attitude towards 
Russia on the issue of Abkhazia’s and South 
Ossetia’s status contributes to growing tensions 
in the Caucasus region, the stability of which 
is essential for the implementation of the EU’s 
southern energy corridor. Conversely, accepting a 
compromise on the status question would enable 
the EU to gain the trust of Abkhaz and South 
Ossetian authorities and potentially increase its 
economic and political influence in both entities.
With regard to the Transnistrian conflict, 
Brussels should match its economic leverage with 
bold diplomatic initiatives, which should result 
in a new and comprehensive peace plan. In order 
to have some chance of success, such diplomatic 
initiatives should take into account Russian 
interests. Thus, the Transnistrian conflict should be 
included in the agenda of the biannual EU-Russia 
summits, where Brussels could make concessions 
in areas of high priority for Russia, such as visa 
liberalization, so as to reach an agreement. 
A similar bargaining approach could be adopted 
for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In this case, 
however, the EU first needs to define a consistent 
and externally coherent policy that applies to both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, particularly with regard 
92 Akçakoca, Vanhauwaert, Whitman and Wolff, ‘After Georgia’, p. 37.
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to the issue of reconciling the principles of self-
determination of peoples and states’ territorial 
integrity. The EU simply cannot afford to pursue 
mutually exclusive policies, which alienate and 
further antagonize the involved parties.
Lastly, and most importantly, the success 
of Brussels’ involvement in the resolution of 
protracted conflicts greatly depends on the 
member states’ unity and their effective support 
for EU policies. In particular, member states need 
to make a decision whether they really want to 
have a strong CFSP, or whether they would like 
the EU to keep its current low profile, which 
has led to such meager results. This question is 
particularly relevant to large member states, such 
as France, which prefers keeping its seat in the 
OSCE Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh, rather 
than transferring that role to the pertinent EU 
institutions. However, the question also applies to 
smaller Central-Eastern European member states 
that, as shown during the August 2008 crisis, 
tend to see the Eastern dimension of the CFSP 
as a means of defying Russia from a stronger 
diplomatic position.93 Such attitudes within 
the EU, focusing on particularistic interests, 
ultimately prevent the formulation of constructive 
policies that could enhance the Union’s diplomatic 
action with regard to the protracted conflicts. This 
ultimately leaves Russia as the only dialogue 
partner with a clearly defined agenda for the 
separatist entities.
93 Schmidt-Felzmann, ‘All for one? EU member states and the 
Union’s common policy towards the Russian Federation’, pp. 
169-187.
